and allocate resource and attention away from Ukraine. Instead, they need to sustain this aid whatever the details of any agreement with Russia. In particular, Europeans should, first, provide Ukraine with more of the ammunition and capabilities that can help it counter any Russian offensives. This includes maintaining the flow of 155mm ammunition

However, neither of these two EU responses are underpinned by a proper strategy which takes into account what kind of Ukraine there will actually be once the fighting stops. European troops and military instructors alone cannot help with the country’s reconstruction. Nor is EU accession a silver bullet: membership will take years to materialise a

This paper goes beyond the ups and downs of day-to-day negotiations and battlefield fighting to counsel Europeans to look to the horizon: what lies just out of sight, and how can they shape the landscape that lies there? It examines how Europe can protect its interests in the medium to long term when a durable ceasefire (or even a peace deal) emerg

offered by a friendly and stable Ukraine went to waste in the absence of a “beyond the horizon” plan. Europeans were not ready for how quickly that horizon drew near. Now EU member states face constant full-spectrum threats right along the bloc’s borders, continued westward migration and the legacy of billions of euros sunk into what became a

interconnectors and build five major bridges and highways in just three years—a process that would normally take nearly a decade. This has created the most seamless trade relationship yet between Ukraine and the EU. Ukraine’s growing and increasingly zero-emission electricity exports, supported by the new interconnectors and protected nuclear p